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Japanese banks are highly capitalized in terms of market value.
Here is a method for testing hypotheses about determinants of
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Japanese banks are promising sources of capital  class size/charter partition of the Japanese
for developing countries wishing to finance a  banking system. For each type of hidden capital
balance of payments gap.  Kane, Unal, and  and each class of bank, the model develops
Demirguc-Kunt show that Japanese banks are  estimates of the stock market, interest rate,
highly capitalized in terms of market value;  foreign exchange, and real estate sensitivities of
much of their capital is "hidden capital," the  returns to bank stockholders.
divergence between accounting and stock market
estimates.  Only the stock market sensitivities prove
significant, at 5 percent. Time-series regressions
Kane and associates developed a method for  show that the large Japanese banks have devel-
testing hypotheses about two types of hidden  oped stock market betas over two and that the
capital: the misvaluation of on-balance-sheet  value of the bank's beta has come to increase
items (post-acquisition gains and losses that,  with measures of its size and accounting lever-
although they remain unbooked, are bookable  age.
upon the sale of the item under Gencral Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) and  Future research will investigate the sensitiv-
intangible values that GAAP currently desig-  ity of these results to different ways of pooling
nates to be unbookable off-balance-sheet items.  data from individual banks and to more sophisti-
cated methods for estimating various parameters.
They construct a model that explains  They also plan to extend the analysis by imbed-
changes in both types of capital functions of  ding it in a model of how variations in bank-
holding-period retums eamed in Japan on stocks,  customer contracting arrangements in Japan
bonds, yen, and real estate.  They apply the  affect the retums bank stockholders can cam.
model to annual data for 1975-89 and a four-
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I.  Introduction
In  recent  years, Japanese  banks have  become major  players in  world finance.
Many  apparently  knowledgeable  observers  attrioute  this  development  to  the
maintenance of inappropriately low capital requirements  by Japanese authorities
(Corrigan, 1987: Pettway,  Kaneko, and Young, 1990).  However, Japanese banks are
not undercapitalized.  Their stocks show market capitalizations  that average
several times the vilue of the banks' accounting net worths (Kane, 1987; Baer
and Mote, 1989).
Since  becoming  major  world financial institutions,  Japanese banks  have also
become more important lenders to developing countries.  Table 1 documents  the
magnitude of Japanese bank lending to  developing countries.  Japanese banks have
consistently  expanded  their  developing  country  lending and  increased  their
individual country exposure in Latin America (Table 2).  Berteen 1987 and 1988,
although other miajor  countries decreased loans to the regionr's  top four debtor
countries  (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela), Japanese banks added  to
their positions in these countries' debt.
For developing  countries wishing  to  finance a balance-of-payment  gap,
Japanese banks are promising sources.  This paper studies the capital positions
of Japanese banks to understand be..er the growth in  market  capicalization  that
underlies  these banks'  ability to  vithstand  the  risks  of  developing-countrv
2
lending.2
Divergences  between accounting and stock-market estimates  may be described
as  "hidden capital."  Kane  and  Unal  (1990) develop  a  method  for  testing
hypotheses about determinants of two tvpes of hidden capital:  the  misvaluation
of on-balance-sheet items  (post-acquisition  gains and losses that,  although they
remain  unbooked, are bookable upon the sale of the item  under Generally Accepted
Accounting  Principles,  GAAP)  and  intangible  values  which  GAAP  currently
designates to be unbookable off-balance-sheet items.
This paper shows that Japanese banks are highly capitalized on X  r,arket-
value basis and tests hypotheses about the determinants of hidden capital at
Japanese bank..  We first develop estimates of a valuation ration, k, by which
to adjust the book value of a firm's net worth and of the net market value of
unbookable equity elements, U.  These parameters are estimated by regressing
cross-sectionally the market value of the institution's market capitalization
on the book value of its accounting net worth.  This regression equation forms
the heart  of what  Kane  and  Unal  (19'10)  call  the  Statistical  Market  Value
Accounting Model, SMVAM.A second  block  of the  model  endogenizes  changes  in  k and  U as functions
of ex  post  holding  period  returns  on stocks,  bonds,  yen, and  Japanese  real
estate.  This formulation  permits  us not  only to test  hypotheses  about the
determinants  of both forms  of hidden  capital,  but to  use the  model to
explain  variation  in the  me.rket,  interest,  foreign-exchange,  and real-estate
sensitivities  of an institution's  stock.
The analysis  extracts  market,  interest-rate,  foreign-exchange,  and
real-estate  sensitivities  from  a time  series  of cross-section  regressions
that  use accounting  and  rate-of-return  information  to explain  the  market
value  of stockholder  equity  claims.  The f'rst  block of the  model is
estimated  for  each of the 15  years  1975-1989  for four  categories  of Japanese
banks.  The four-class  partition  of the  banking  system  represents  a
conventional  Japanese  classification  that  uses the  names  city  banks,  long-
term  credit  banks,  trust  banks,  and regional  banks.  This  classification
closely  approximates  a size-based  partition,  with city  banks  having the
largest  average  asset  size and  regional  banks the  smallest  average  asset
size throughout  the  period  we study.
II.  Model  and  Diagaostic  Checks
The SMVAM  is  estimated  separately  at each  date for  members  of each
class  of institution:
MV - Ut +  ktBV  + e.  (1)4
MV and  BV denote  the  market  and  book  value  of firm  equity.  U is interpreted
as the  market  value  of unbookable  equity,  while  k is the  valuation  ratio
that serves  to adjust  the  value  of bookable  items  to  market.  These
coefficients  measure  the  de facto  deceptiveness  of the  Japanese  accounting
system.  Unless  both  U - 0 and  k - 1, the  accounting  or book value  of a
bank's  capital  represents  a biased  estimate  of the  market  value  of
stockholder equity. If the estimated intercept is significantly  positive
(negative),  unbookable  assets  and liabilities  serve  as a net  hidden  source
of (drain  on) institutional  capital.
Equation  (1)  assumes  that  a single  mark-up  or mark-down  ratio,  k
applies  to all  accounting  values  reported  by the institution.  In effect,  a
single  valuation  ratio  k is  assumed  to apply  to every  component  of each
institution's  book equity.  We test this  restriction  by estimating  different
coefficients  for  aggregate  assets  and aggregate  liabilities  i  each class
of bank.  However,  except  for  regional  banks,  the  hypothesis  of a common  k
proves  impossible  to reject.  Even for  regional  banks,  significant
differences  between  asset  and liability  valuation  ratios  emerge  only after
1985.
A second  diagnostic  check is to test for  nonlinear  terms  in SMVAM.  In
particular,  we investigate  the  effect  of introducing  a squared  or quadratic
term in  BV.  The coefficient  of the  squared  term  proves  insignificant  at 5
percent  for  city  banks in all  years.  However,  although  we choose  not to
pursue  the  issue  here, the  evidence  suggests  that  a nonlinear  specification
may  be appropriate  in some  years  and  especially  for  smaller  institutions,5
Long-term  credit  and trust  banks  show  significant  and  positive  coefficients
for  BV2 in  years  1982-84  and 1988.  For  regional  banks,  the  BV2 coefficient
proves  significantly  negative  in 1977  and 1981-83,  but  becomes  positive  and
significant  'i.  iater  years,  1985-88.
The  parameters  of the  linear  SMVAM  are  U and  k. When returns  on
competitive  assets  change  over  time,  these  parameters  should  respond.  Using
an annual  observation  period,  we approximate  this response  by a linear
model  of market  returns,  interest  rates,  dollar  investments  in  yen, and
returns  on Japanese  real  estpte:
u  Ut  - u  + O  Rmt  +  rRt + #fR  t +  '  RL  (2)
-k  ~k  k  kt  ok'tL't Vt  3 kt - kt.l - 00 + 0m RMt + 0rRt  + OkfFt  + pkRLt  + w  t'(3)
Rmt  Rt,  RFt'  and  RLt represent  holding-period  returns  on a stock-market
index,  a bond index,  dollar  investments  in  yen, and  Japanese  real estate,
respectively.  We include  RFt and  R½t to test the  often-heard  conjecture  that
Japanese  bank stock  has  benefited  greatly  from  appreciation  in the  yen and
in  Japanese  real  estate.  The  vt and  wt are  stochastic  error terms  The slope
coefficients  measure  the  market,  interest-rate,  foreign-exchange,  and real-
estate  sensitivity  of SMVAM's  parameters.
Equations  (2)  and (3)  are  offered  as flexible  functional  forms  that
parameterize  in  an interpretable  and parsimonious  way revaluations  that6
asset  markets  make continually.  Results  to  be developed  in later  sections  of
this  paper  indicate  that  movements  in  Ut and k  are explained  predominantly
by the  first  influence  (stock  returns),  with the  other  vaLiables  having  no
significant  effects.  The  Japanese  stock-market  index  proves  significant  for
every  class  of  bank.  This is consistent  with a further  finding  that  Japanese
banks  have  come to own  over  40 percent  of the  universe  of Japanese  corporate
stocks.  This  makes investment  in these  banks'  stock  shares  in large  part a
leveraged  investment  in the  Japanese  stock  market  as a whole.
To furnish  a complementary  perspective,  we also  estimate  a traditional
multi-ind.-:  market  model.  Using this  model,  stock-market  betas for large
Japanese  banks are  shown  to surge  sharply  upward  after 1983.
III.  Data and  Sam'le  Characteristics
The data set  includes  market  and  book  values  for the  capital  and total
assets  of every  Japanese  bank in  existence  during  the 1975-1989  sample
period.  For regional  ban!s,  the  sample  size  varies  over the sample  period,
but 13 city  banks,  3 long-term  credit  banks  and 6 trust  banks  exist
throughout.  (A  seventh  trust  bank exists,  but its stock  does  not trade.)
The number  of regional  banks  sampled  expands  from  44 to 91.
Data are  obtained  from  Nihon  Keizai  Shimlun  America,  Inc.  Market  values
are  determined  in  accordance  with  Japanese  corporate  reporting  practices  as
of March  31st  and  calculated  as the  product  of share  price and  number  of
shares  outstanding.  The  book  value  of equity  capital  totals  accounting7
entries  for  stock  subscription,  legal  reserves  and ea.rned  surplus  at the
same  dates.
Chart  1 reports  ratios  of the  book value  of stockholder  equity  to t,tal
assets.  Although  these  ratios  are  mvch lower  than those  reported  by
comparable  U.S. banks,  these  banks  cannot  reasonably  be characterized  as
lacking  in  capital.  Chart  2 clarifies  that  over the  sample  period  a high and
rising  ratio  of mean  market  value to  book  value  obtained  for  city  bank-,
long-term  credit  banks,  trust  banks  and regional  banks.
These  charts  indicate  that  hidden  capital  expands  greatly  during  the
late  1980s.  The  MV/BV  ratio  first  exceeds  2 for  city banks  and long-term
credit  banks in 1982  and  for  trust  banks in  1984.  Tte ratio  continues  to
increase  until  1987,  when it peaks  for  the  first  three  classes,  at 8.9,
10.6,  and 11.8,  respectively.  From these  respective  peaks,  MV/BV  declines  to
5.8,  7.5  and 4.9  by 1989.
Compared  to the  other  three  classes,  regional  banks show  a lower  and
less-volatile  MV/BV ratio.  The  ratio  does  not exceed  two  until 1986,  peaks
at 3.28  two  years later,  and  declines  to 2.96 in 1989.
The indices  needed  to estimate  equations  (2)  and (3)  have to be
approximated.  Although  data  on dividend  yields  are lacking,  Japanese
dividend  rates  are reputed  to be low  and  relatively  stable.  This  makes it
reasonable  to approximate  the  holding-period  return  on a stock  by its  annual
rate  of price  appreciation.8
Chart  3 tracks  annual  percentage  changes  from the  dates  shown in the
mean  market  capitalization  of each  class  of  bank.  TEhis  price  appreciation  is
the  major  portion  of the  return  realized  by stockholders  in Japanese  banks.
Chart  4 tracxs  percentage  returns  in four  potential  determinants  of U
and  k. The 225-stock  Tokyo  index  constructed  by Nikkei  (Rmt)  is used as a
proxy for  the  stock  market  as a whole.  The  Nikkei  bond index  is used to
calculate  a proxy  holding-period  return  for  bonds.  The index  reports  a daily
average  yield  on public  and  private  debt  securities.  We derive  annual
holding-period  returns  from this  Index  by treating  t  e underlying  bunds  as
consols  whose  coupon  equals  Ytl1  the  yield  obse.-ved  at the  end  of the
previous  year. specifically,
t  yt-.  (Yt -Yt1)/Yt
Returns  on real  estate  come from  Japan  Real Estate  Research  Institute
(JRERI).  JRERI  surveys  140  major  cities  in  Japan twice  a year (in  March and
September)  and  constructs  a land  price  index.  Again,  lacking  parallel  data
on periodic  rernts,  the  annual  percentage  changes  in the index  are treated  as
a proxy  for  real-estate  returns  in  Japan.  Data for  the  Nikkei  stock-market
and bond indices  and the  JRERI  land  price index  are obtained  from Nihon
Keizai  Shimbun.
Finally,  yeci  returns  (Rft)  are  proxied  by percentage  change  in the
value of the  yen  against  U.S. dollar,  using  data compiled  by the  World Bank.9
IV.  SMVAM  Results
SMVAM's  accounting  equation  has two  parameters.  Charts  5 and 6 display
the  pattern  of annual  cross-sectional  estimates  at each of the  four  bank
classes.  With only  three  banks in the  long-term  credit  bank class,  separate
regressions  for  this  class  have  only one  degree  of freedom  and large
standard  errors.  Nevertheless,  covariance  or dummy-variable  analysis  shows
that  these  institutions  differ  so significantly  from the  other  three  classes
that it is inappropriate  to  pool them  with  any other  class.
To test  the  U - 0 and  k - 1  hypothesis  of "fully  informative  accounting
values"  for  each  class  separately,  we focus  on the  time  series  of
coefficient  deviations  from  the  hypothesized  values.  Table  3 reports  test
results.The  combined  U-0 and  k-l  condition  which  would  make recorded  equity
an unbiased  estimate  of rarket  value  is rejected  for  city  banks in  all years
and is accepted  for  long-term  credit  banks  only in 1980.  Accounting
representations  of trust  banks  prove  de:eptive  in all  but two  years:  1980
and 1981.  In contrast,  accounting  data for  regional  banks appear  reliable
through 1984. But after that date, the regional.  banks' k proves
significantly greater than unity.
For  city  banks,  the  deviations  of  U and  k retain  a single  sign
throughout.  U is negative  and significant,  indicating  net  unbookable  items
as a drain  on equity.  As a percentage  of mean  MV, this  drain  begins  at 6
percent  in 1975,  peaks  in 1984  at 40 percent,  and  decreases  to 23  percent in
1989. The valuation ratio for bookable items proves significantly in excess
of one and reaches very high levels in the late 1980s.10
A  high valuation  ratio  constitutes  evidence  of on-balance-sheet  "hidden
capital."  Securities  and  real  estate  that  are carried  on bank books  at
historical  cost  become  increasingly  undervalued  when market  values  trend
upward.  Throughout  the  late  1980s,  unbooked  but  bookable  capital  gains
appear  substantial.  If a market-value  accounting  system  were used, increases
(and  decreases)  in  market  values  would  La  booked  as earnings  as they  accrue
and  reflected  in the  book  value  of equity.  However,  if  used as a basis for
calculating  taxable  income,  market-value  tax  accounting  would  simultaneously
create  an immediate  tax liability  on accrued  gains.  Under the  system  of
cash-flow  tax  accounting  that is in  place,  Japanese  banks  effect  tax savings
by not immediately  realizing  (i.e.,  encashing)  their  capital  gains.
For large  banks,  off-balance-sheet  equity  proves  large  and  negative  in
many instances,  especially  in the  later  years  of our sample.  The pattern  of
secular  fall  and 1988-89  recovery  mirrors  the rise  and  fall of the  MV/BV
ratios  reported  in Chart  2. This is consistent  with the  hypothesis  that
observed  negative  off-balance-sheet  positions  can  be conceived
predominantly  as reserves  for  deferred  taxes  on  unrealized  gains  in stock
and  real-estate  holdings.  U must also  capture  the  capitalized  value  of the
implicit  net subsidy  or tax  associated  with restrictions  or advantages
conferred  on banks  by the  Japanese  Ministry  of Finance  (MOF).  We hold that
movements  in tax  reserves  dominate  U because  it is  unlikely  that the  net
advantageousness  of  MOF restrictions  could  change  as rapidly  from  year to
year  as our estimates  of U do.i1
We turn  now to the  revaluation  equations  (2)  and (3),  which  are
estimated  in  Tables  4  and  5. For  every  bank  class,  results  are  qualitativel.'
the  same.  Off-balance-sheet  equity  decreases  as stock  returns  increase
(significantly  so for  city and  long-term  credit  banks).  It also  decreases
with  bond and  foreign-exchange  returns  and rises  with land  returns,  but  not
significantly.  The  valuation  ratio  k for  on-balance-sheet  items  shows  in
each  case an opposite  pattern,  and  again  only the  stock  return  ever  achieves
significance.  However,  because  error  terms  are  apt to  be correlated  within
and  across  bank classes,  ordinary-least-squares  estimates  of standard  errors
are  biased  upward.  More-efficient  estimation  methods  might  well render  real-
estate,  foreign-exchange,  or bond returns  significant  in at least  some
cases.
During  the first  quarter  of 1990,  while  the  Nikkei  225  index  declined
by roughly  25 percent,  the  market  capitalization  of individual  city  banks
declined  by as much  as 33  percent.  To the  extent  these  banks represent  a
leveraged  investment  in  the stock  market  as a whole,  a massive  stock-market
decline  could  rapidly  undermine  the  strength  of large  Japanese  banks'
capital  positions.
V. Results  for  the  Multi-Index  Market  Model
Tables  4 and 5 assign  Rm and  the  other  index  variables  opposite  effects
on  U and  k. The  hypothesis  that  U may  be interpreted  principally  as a
reserve  for  deferred  taxes  implies  that  these  variables'  effects  through  k
shuuld strongly outweigh their effects through U.12
Fitting a multi-index market model (MIMM)  provides a straightforward
way to check this. The version of MIMM that we fit expands the basic market
model by adding bond returns, real-estate returns, and returns on dollar
investments in yen. We include returns on yen and real-estate even though
they prove insignificant in Tables 4  and  5 because we want to allow for the
possibility that effects operating through U and k might cumulate to
significance. The MIMM stochastic return-generating process specifies that
the return Rp on portfolio p is:
RPt - %+ Omp Rmt +rp  Rt +  Ofp Rft +Lp  RLt +zt.  (4)
In (4), MP'  rp' 6fp, and OLp measure the portfolio's systematic market,
interest-rate, foreign-exchange and real-estate risk.
We construct Rpt as an equal-weighted portfolio of returns for every
bank in each class. For each class, Table 6 reports pooled time-series,
cross-section estimates of equation (4).
For each class, the net sensitivity of bank stock price appreciation to
market returns turns out to be positive and significant. For the largest
three size classes, stock-market betas all exceed two. Because Charts 3, 5,
and 6 suggest a mid-1980s shift in return-generating processes for banks, we
experiment with relaxing the assumption of stationarity by fitting the model
separately to 1975-83 and 1984-89 under the restriction  fp and  Lp equal13
3
zero.  In these  runs,  betas  prove  negative  for the three largest  size
classes in the  early  years  and positive  and large  during  the 1984-1989
4
period  only.
The striking  feature  of the  various  runs is the  sky-high level  of
market  risk toward  which the average  member  of the first three  bank size
classes  evolved.  These  betas range  from 2 to 3,  which is  two to three cimes
the  magnitude  of the  estimates  both for regional  Japanese  banks and of
parallel  estimates  for large  U.S. banks obtained  by Unal and Kane (1988)
with quarterly  1975.1985  data.  These  high betas confirm the hypothesis  that,
when a leveraged  institution  has a large  diversified  position in the stock
market,  its  market  capitalization  moves  by a multiple  of the  price movements
observed  for the  market  as a whole.
In the  Japanese  stock-market  decline  of the first  quarter of 1990, the
prices  of the  high-beta  bank stocks  fell  more rapidly  than the  overall
Japanese  market index.  This  has important  implications  for  policymakers.  The14
capital position of banks that invest heavily in corporate stock is more
volatile than the stock market itself. The market capitalization of high-
beta bank stocks can decline suddenly and markedly. In a world where
governments insure de facto all of the debts of large domestic banks,  this
volatility implies that, to protect Japanese taxpayers, risk-based market-
value capital requirements should be designed to increase with the size of
each bank's market beta.
Individual-Bank Runs. To investigate within-class variation in market betas,
Table 7 reports the results of estimating the one-index version of equation
(4) for the individual banks in each class for which we have data for all 15
years. Although we do not report results for the four-index model, R, RL,
and Rf prove significant in time-series runs for only few of these banks.
The market betas found for most members of each of the three largest
size  classes prove to be of the same order of magnitude as in the pooled
run. The 24 regional banks that show significant market betas appear to
follow portfolio strategies that are more similar to those followed by
larger institutions than to those pursued by fellow members of their charter
class.
When we allow for a possible structural shift in individual market
betas after 1983, high market betas develop only during the later subsample.
A visual inspection of the data reveals that high betas are typically driven
by 1985, 1987 and 1988 observations. In these years, the market
capitalizations of institutions show extraordinary increases relative to the15
market.  These  beta estimates  are  much higher  than those  reported  by Pettway,
Tapley  and  Yamada  (1988).  Pettway,  Tapley  and  Yamada  cover  different  sample
years (1982-1983  and  1984-1986)  and  use daily  data.  Neglecting  data from
1987-89  would  tend  to lower  our  beta estimates  substantially.  To some
degree,  these  authors'  lower  betas  may also reflect  downward  bias  due to
employing  daily  data  on stocks  that  fail to trade  daily.
Tracking  Variation  in  Market  Betas  at Individual  Banks.  Pettway,  Sicherman,
and  Yamada  (1990)  contrast  an observed  tendency  for  market  betas  of Japanese
corporations  to increase  with size  against  the  stylized  tendency  for  market
betas  to decline  with size for  U.S. firms  (Reinganum,  1981;  Chang  and
Prinegar,  1989).  These  authors  attribute  this  differential  behavior  to
presumed  differences  in  management  objectives  at  U.S. and  Japanese
corporations.  While  U.S.  corporations'  internal  diversification  is  believed
to increase  with  size,  in  Japan  agency  costs  associated  lender  influence  on
decisions  by corporate  managers  are  held to rise  with size.  Agency  costs in
Japanese  banking  relationships  are  studied  by Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and
Scharfstein  (1989).
The following  ad hoc regression  equation  supports  the  hypothesis  that
Japanese  banks  with  high  market  betas  are  larger  and  more  highly  leveraged
than  other  banks:
jm-  -. 81  - 32.1  (BV./TA.)  +  0.22  (ln  TA  R  _ 22.  (5)
jm  (-  .43)  (1.98)  (2.06)16
In (5),  t-values  are  reported  in parenthesis,  jm  is  bank j's  market
- - ~~~~~th
betas from  Table  7, while  BV. and  TA;  denote  the  j  bank's  average  book-
value  and  total  assets  over 1975-1989.
When the  market  model  and the  ad hoc  equation  (5)  are fitted  separatelv
to 1975-83  and 1984-89,  the  magnitude  and significance  of the  slope
coefficients  may be traced  entirely  to the 1984-89  period.  Before  1984,
leverage  does  not significantly  affect  a Japanese  bank's  market  beta.  As
with U.S.  banks,  betas significantly  decline  with size.  Hence:  this
divergence  between  U.S. and  Japanese  bank  behavior  is of  recent  origin.
VI.Opportunities  for  Future  Research
Although  the  ordinary-least-squares  estimates  reported  in this  paper
seem  reliable  enough  to support  qualitative  inferences,  more sophisticated
econometric  procedures  may  be able to  establish  a role for  bond, land,  or
foreign-exchange  returns.  In future  research,  we plan to use seemingly
unreated regression,  crossed  regression,  nonlinear  formulations,
simultaneous-equation  models,  and  heteroskedasticity  adjustments.  We also
plan to  use covariance  analysis  to disaggregate  regional  banks into high-
beta and  low-beta  groups  and to test  whether  SMVAM  equations  for banks  with
similar  betas can  be pooled  across  charter  types.
We further  plan to analyze  contracting  arrangements  inherent  in
Japanese  financial  institutions  and  markets.  The goal  of  this investigation
is to  help us to sort  out  how contracting  arrangements  between  and among17
banks  and  related  and  unrelated  corporations  affect  the  size and
distribution  of agency  costs  in  Japan.18
FOOTNOTES
1. This figure is lower after the recent decline of the Japanese stock market.
2.  More recently there  has been an overall decrease in commercial bank exposure
to  developing countries. Nevertheless, Japanese ban k exposures still remain  one
of the highest among creditor countries.
3. Support  for  the  timing  of  this  sample  partition  may  also  be  found  in
regulatory events. Pettway, Tarpley, and Yamada  (1988) associate a post-1983
expansion  of bank risk-taking  with a reduction in  administrative guidance, while
Cargill and Royama (1988)  note an acceleration in money-market development.
4. Experiments not reported here allow each of Rfp and RLP  to be the second index
and confirm the usefulness of going on to  allow for structural shifts in (2) and
(3)  as well.19
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TABLE  1:  IUEAL  LUNDIN  T  DEVELOPING  03lifRS  - 1980-1988
(In  miLLUL of  US$)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
UuitLd States
Total  9,947  9,445  12,049  14,533  16,732  10,912  8,069  5,623  5,346
tmnercial  Bank  3,855  3,857  5,997  8,359  10,832  5,585  3,602  2,515  1,361
Japan
Total  5,098  5,041  6,323  6,672  8,488  9,613  12,494  12,519  13,329
Ccuu(mmcial  Bank  1,089  558  986  1,394  2,235  2,980  2,998  3,821  4,877
Gerqm
Ttalr  5,L30  4,606  .,817  2,789  2,266  3,035  2,943  4,358  5,490
Comr6cia1 Bank  716  1,031  270  162  277  447  247  1,217  1,298
Frm
Total  7,040  6,171  7,188  4,326  4,136  4,L36  5,041  4,92D  5,172
Caiwarciaal Bak  2,663  2,555  2,828  1,086  1,107  1,312  1,220  718  1,069
Switzerland
Total  1,320  824  1,249  931  1,107  937  548  755  1,125
Camercial  Blak  717  275  278  330  796  252  142  450  484
Italy
Total  1,392  1,483  941  1,598  1,161  702  1,074  1,029  1,115
Ca.z:rcial  Bank  107  45  60  14  129  41  56  328  66
S,.urce:  The Wrld  Bak29
TABLE  2.  LOA  M  A110  MMICAN  (L  RIES  BY  CMERI.AL BMCS
197  - 198
(in  milli  of  US$)
U.S.  U.K  FJRAKH  GNY  .APAS
87  8s  87  as  87  88  87  88  87  88
AJENrll  8,812  7,879  4,290  4,108  2,136  2.299  4,476  4,716  4,982  5,611
1AZIL  21,275  19,N1  9,859  7,85  8,918  8,519  8,574  7,705  9,132  9,723
Pma)  2,722  17,887  8,M8  8,291  5,535  4,559  4,145  3,725  11,058  11,372
VENWJELA  8,320  8,ODI  2,703  2,625  2,806  2,779  2,254  2,318  3,791  3,826
3IKZ:  Finx-idA  flows to  deveoping  cxutri:  lhe Wbrld Bank30
Table 3: Summary Outcomes at 5-percent Significance of Separate
Tests of the Hypotheses that U Equals Zero and k Equals Unity
Long Term  Regional
City Banks  Credit Banks  Trust Banks  Banks
Year  U  k  U  k  U  k  U  k
1975  0  >1  0  >1  0  >1  0  >1
1976  0  >1  +  >1  0  >1  0  1
1977  0  >1  +  >1  0  1  0  1
1978  - >1  0  >1  0  >1  0  1
1979  - >1  +  1  0  >1  0  1
1980  - >1  0  1  0  1  0  1
1981  - >1  0  >1  0  1  0  1
1982  - >1  >1  0  >1  0  1
1983  - >1  0  >1  0  1  0  1
1984  - >1  - >1  0  >1  0  1
1985  - >1  - >1  0  >1  0  >1
1986  - >1  - >1  - >1  0  >1
1987  - >1  - >1  - >1  0  >1
1988  - >1  - >1  - >1  0  >1
1989  - >1  - >1  0  >1  0  >131
Table  4: Estimates  of the Full  Repricing  Model (2)  and
a Deleted  Two-Index  Model (TIM)  for  Changes in the
Value of  Off-Balance-Sheet  Equity  at Four Classes
of Japanese  Banks,  1975-1989
Exchange
Stock  Bonds  Land  Rate
uO  pu  pu  pu  puf  R2  ADJ R2
0  ~~m  rLf
City Banks
Model (2):  172  -2024*  -397  1873  -581  .50  .28
(241)  (774)  (664)  (2880)  (874)
TIM:  237  -1679*  -376  .44  .34
(129)  (587)  (489)
Long-Term  Credit  Banks
Model (2):  533  -5217*  -2171  6457  -2390  .45  .21
(734)  (2355)  (2021)  (8762)  (2659)
TIM:  735  -3817*  -1982  .35  .23
(407)  (1842)  (1535)
Trust Banks
Model (2):  40  -363  -489  1358  -273  .36  .08
(132)  (426)  (366)  (1586)  (481)
TIM:  100  -194  -523  .27  .13
(72)  (327)  (272)
Regional  Banks
Model (2):  .97  -35  -23  98  -23  .32  .02
(8.9)  (28)  (24)  (106)  (32)
TIM:  5.0  -21  -24  .19  .04
(4.9)  (22)  (18)
Notes:
1.  The  holding-period  return  on  bonds is approximated  by the following  formula:
Rt  - Bond  Yieldt1  Bond  Yieldt - Bond  Yield t 1
t  Bond  Yieldt
2. Standard  errors  are stated in  brackets  and asterisks  denote  coefficients  whose value
differs  significantly  from  zero at 5  percent.
3. Each intercept  represents  a trend term  measured  in  billions  of yen.32
Table 5: Estimates  of the Full  Repricing  Model (3)  and A Deleted
Two-Index  Model (TIM)  for Changes  in the  Valuation  Ratio k
for  On-Balance-Sheet  Equity  at Four  Classes  of Japanese Banks,
1975-1989
Exchange
Stock  Bonds  Land  Rate
k  k  k  k  k  R2  ADJ R2
0  ~~m  ~  r  kLRADf
City  Banks
Model (3):  -. 77  12*  2.4  -17  4.7  .41  .15
(1.78)  (5)  (4.9)  [21]  (6.4)
TIM:  -1.4  9.4*  2.5  .31  .18
(.9)  (4.4)  (3.7)
Long-Term  Credit Banks
Model (3):  -2.4  23*  10  -30  10  .49  .26
(3.1)  (10)  (8)  (37)  (11)
TIM:  -3.3  17*  9.7  .38  .27
(1.7)  (7)  (6)
Trust Banks
Model (3):  -1.0  12  8  -29  7  .48  .25
(2.1)  (7)  (6)  (26)  (7)
TIM:  -2.1  7  9  .33  .21
(1.2)  (5)  (4)
Rezional  Banks
Model (3):  -. 2  2.2  .8  -1.8  .59  .37  .10
(.3)  (1.2)  (1.0)  (4.5)  (1.3)
TIM:  -.2  1.9  .8  .34  .23
(.19)  (.8)  (.7)
Notes:
1. The  holding-period  return  on bonds is approximated  by the following  formula:
Rt =  Bond Yield  t 1 - tBond  Yieldt - Bond  Yield t-1]
Bond  Yield  t
2. Standard  errors  are stated in  parenthesis  and asterisks  denote  coefficients  whose  value
differs  significantly  from  zero at 5 percent.33
Table 6: Estimated  Multi-Index  Market  Models
for Four Classes  of  Japanese  Banks, 1975-1989
Exchange
Intercept  Stock  Bonds  Land  Rate
0  fr  LR2
Citv  Banks
-. 09  2.3*  .30  -. 66  .70  .42
(.31)  (1.0)  (.87)  (3.7)  (1.1)
Long-Term  Credit  Banks
-.17  2.3*  .76  .02  .58  .70
(.18)  (.6)  (.51)  (2.2)  (.67)
Trust  Banks
-. 2  3.4*  1.3  -3.4  1.2  .71
(.2)  (.9)  (.7)  (3.3)  (1.0)
Regional  Banks
.04  .99*  .09  -1.1  .06  .54
(.12)  (.38)  (.33)  (1.4)  (.43)
Notes:
1.  The holding-period  return  on bonds is  approximated  by the following  formula:
R  - Bond  Yieldt  1 [Bond  Yield  - Bond  Yield t-1]
Bond Yield  t
2. Standard  errors are stated  in parenthesis  and asterisks  denote  coefficients  whose  value
differs  significantly  from zero  at 5 percent.
3.  Except  for regional  banks, the two-index  model  has the  highest adjusted  R2 of all  possible
2 combinations.  For regional  banks, the third  equation  listed  has the highest  adjusted  R34
Table 7: Time-Series Estimates of the Market Model
for Individual Japanese Banks, 1975-1989
Rjt  %jo+  '  jm 'Mt  + Ujt.
p0
Citv Banks
Bank of Tokyo  .03  1.35*
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank  -. 04  2.05*
Daiwa Bank  -.29  3.33*
Fuji  Bank  -.06  2.14*
Hokkaido Takushoku  -.03  1.52*
Kyowa Bank  -.02  1.36*
Mitsubishi Bank  -.07  2.11*
Mitsui Bank  .04  1.43
Saitama Bank  -.06  1.68*
Sanwa Bank  -.08  2.16*
Sumitomo Bank  -.02  1.89*
Taiyo Kobe Bank  -.09  1.85*
Tokai Bank  -.05  1.99*
Lon2-Term Credit Banks
Industrial Bank of Japan  -.07  2.38*
Long-Term Credit Bank  -.01  1.62*
Nippon Credit Bank  -.02  1.55*
Trust Banks
Mlitsubishi  Trust  -.14  3.05*
Mitsui Trust  -.05  2.01*
Nippon Trust  -.11  1.99*
Sumitomo Trust  -.15  2.92*
Tovo  Trust  -.33  4.01*
Yasuda Trust  -.13  2.68*
Regional Banks
Akita Bank  .18  .00
Aomori Bank  .12  .23
Ashikaga Bank  -.01  1.28*
Awa Bank  -.07  1.44*
Bank of Hiroshima  -.03  1.20*
Bank of Ikeda  -.01  .70
Bank of Iwate  .10  .47
Chiba Bank  .05  .98*
Chiba Kogyo Bank  .01  1.20*
Daishi Bank  .02  .79*
Eighteenth Bank  .08  .47
Fukui Bank  -. 02  1.26
Gunma Bank  -.04  1.35*
Hachijuni Bank  .11  .67
Higashi Nippon  -.09  1.69*
Hokkoku Bank  .10  .47
Hokuetsu Bank  .04  .69
Hokuriku Bank  -.02  1.42*35
Table 7 (continued)
Regional Banks
Hyakugo Bank  -.07  1.66*
Hyakujushi Bank  .03  .79*
Iyo Bank  .03  74*
Joyo Bank  .11  .64
Juroku Bank  -.02  1.13*
Kagoshima Bank  .13  .22
Kanto Bank  -.14  1.68*
Keiyo Bank  -. 06  1.77*
Kiyo Bank  .02  .96*
Musashino Bank  -. 07  1.33*
Niigata Sogo  .04  .78
Nishi-Nippon Bank  .03  .94*
Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank  .06  .69
Oita Bank  .11  .14
Shikoku Bank  .02  .82
Shinwa Bank  .08  .43
Shizuoka Bank  .06  1.15*
Sugura Bank  .02  .86
Taiyheiyo Bank  -.11  2.32*
The 77 Bank  -.00  1.15*
Toho Bank  .14  .30
Tokyo Sowa  -.54  5.29*
Tokyo Tomin Bank  .07  .88
Yamagata Bank  .06  .68
Yamanashi Bank  -.08  1.88*
*  Indicates market betas that differ significantly from zero at five
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